Reasoning about Knowledge in Context by Lihoreau, Franck & Rebuschi, Manuel
Chapter 7
Reasoning about Knowledge in Context
Franck Lihoreau and Manuel Rebuschi
7.1 Introduction
A major goal of post-cartesian epistemology is to respond to radical skepticism, the
view that we know (almost) nothing of what we ordinarily take ourselves to know.
The argument most commonly associated with this view is the so-called “argument
from ignorance”. It starts with the premise that we cannot exclude the possibility
that we might be in such alternative worlds as those described by Descartes’ Evil
Genius hypothesis or by Putnam’s Brain in a Vat scenario. The alleged reason for
this inability is that these skeptical hypotheses are designed in such a way that if we
were in the skeptical worlds they describe, we’d have exactly the same experiences,
memories, beliefs, etc., as those that we actually have, so that for all we know,
we might be in these worlds of mass(ive) error. From here, the skeptic’s reasoning
takes us to the conclusion that we do not know any (or most) of the things that
we ordinarily take ourselves to know, for instance, that we have hands, that we are
sitting at our desk, etc.
The problem is, of course, that this skeptical conclusion goes against our pow-
erful tendency to think that we do know a lot about many things. In the last few
decades, emphasis has been put on the importance, in dealing with this problem,
of taking (some notion of) context into consideration when thinking about knowl-
edge and knowledge ascription. This shows in the ever-growing number of discus-
sions on so-called “contextualist” approaches as defended by Cohen [5, 4], DeRose
[7, 8, 9], Heller [19, 20], Lewis [26, 27] and others, as well as the increasing interest
in theories of “subject-sensitive” knowledge ascriptions à la Hawthorne [18] and
Stanley [35], and of “assessment-sensitive” ascriptions following Macfarlane [29],
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to mention but a few of the available accounts that have context playing a significant
epistemological role.
In Section 7.2, we present four major epistemological positions on the problem of
skepticism, with a view to showing the importance of (different notions of) context
in the recent philosophical discussions on knowledge. In Section 7.3, we provide
the foundations for a general formal framework based on the technical notion of
“contextual models”, which will make it possible to capture those epistemological
positions using one and the same language and semantics, and to investigate the
logical connections they are bound to endorse between knowledge and context. Fi-
nally, Section 7.4 adds to that “static” formalism a “dynamic” formalization of con-
text based on a simplified version of Discourse Representation Theory, which will
allow us to account for the apparent variation over the course of a conversation in
the epistemic standards of the participants, and to overcome such difficulties as the
logical omniscience problem that usually plagues normal modal logical approaches
to knowledge.
In short, our purpose is to provide formal tools for exploring reasoning about
knowledge in context in both its static and dynamic aspects.
7.2 Highlights of Informal Epistemology
In this section we briefly describe and illustrate four prominent positions on the
problem of skepticism which, through the discussions they have given rise to in
the recent philosophical literature on knowledge, have significantly contributed to
making context an issue of prime epistemological importance.
Anti-skeptical Invariantism
The first position, anti-skeptical invarantism as we will call it, which can also be
found in the literature under the name “moderate invariantism” or “radical anti-
skepticism”, has it that many and perhaps most of our ordinary knowledge claims
are literally true. This view is endorsed by the ordinary language philosopher Austin
[3],1 who observes that the epistemic standards that the skeptic has in mind and
which require of us the ability to exclude absolutely all possibilities of error, in-
cluding the most far-fetched ones, are very different from those which govern our
everyday knowledge claims and which do not have such stringent requirements. In
everyday life, the standards in place are such that as long as we have no reason to
think, for example, that we might be brains in vats, we are not required to rule out
this possibility to properly count as knowing, say, that we have hands. Then, ac-
cording to Austin, the only standards that can be legitimate are those that match our
ordinary practice of knowledge ascription. This is the case with the standards that
1 It is very common in the literature to find this position associated with the name G. E. Moore, and
for this reason called “Moorean invariantism”. We find it more convenient to refer to Austin instead.
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prevail in everyday life: we – ordinarily competent speakers – judge many and per-
haps most of our everyday knowledge claims to be correct. Not so with the skeptic’s
standards, which would make it merely impossible to ever use “know” correctly. So,
on this view, we do know a lot.
Skeptical Invariantism
The next position, skeptical invariantism, or simply skepticism, takes us in exactly
the opposite direction by claiming that most and perhaps all of our ordinary knowl-
edge claims are literally false. This claim is held by Unger who, in [36] for instance,
proposes relating the word “know” to a class of natural language expressions that
are systematically used erroneously, yet in a pragmatically correct way, by com-
petent speakers, and which he labels “absolute terms”, as their application admits
no degree/exception. The predicate “flat” is one such term: (most of) our ordinarily
flatness ascriptions are literally false since a surface is flat only if it has absolutely
no bumps or other irregularities on it, but no real physical surface can meet this con-
dition, even microscopically. Real surfaces are, however, close enough to being flat
given our everyday life interests, goals, presuppositions, etc., for those ascriptions
to be justifiedly made, pragmatically speaking. Likewise, “know” too is an absolute
term: because we cannot rule out all logical possibilities of error, (most of) our or-
dinary knowledge ascriptions are literally false; yet, we are pragmatically justified
in making them in that we are close enough, with respect to our everyday purposes,
interests, etc., to satisfying the conditions for a true ascription. In any case, on this
view, we know almost nothing.
Contextualism
A third position, contextualism as it is called, aims at overcoming the apparent con-
flict between skepticism and anti-skepticism by holding that the truth or falsity of
knowledge ascriptions depends on the context in which they are made. It is defended
by Lewis [26, 27] for instance, who claims that for an ascription of the type “S knows
that p” to be true, the possibilities of error that S must be able to rule out are all and
only those that are relevant in the context of the ascription, e.g. those attended to by
the ascriber. This condition is met when no not-p possibility is contextually relevant.
This is the case in everyday contexts for most contingent propositions, e.g. that we
have hands, because in these contexts the far-fetched skeptical possibility that we
might be handless brains in vats simply is irrelevant, and therefore need not be ruled
out. By contrast, in a philosophical context where such skeptical possibilities have
been raised and are being attended to, they are relevant and need to be excluded;
but we are unable to rule them out. In these contexts it is therefore false that we
know that we are not brains in vats and that we have hands. It is true that we know a
lot in ordinary contexts, and very little in skeptical contexts. More generally, on the
contextualist view, whether or not it is true that one knows something will depend
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on the focus, interests, stakes, presuppositions, etc., that make up the context of the
“attributor”, i. e. the person who is attributing/denying knowledge.
Subjectivism
According to subjectivism (or sensitive moderate invariantism, or subject-sensitive
invariantism as it is often called), as defended by Hawthorne [18] or Stanley [35],
such factors as attention, interests, stakes, etc., are considered relevant to the truth
of knowledge ascriptions, but only insofar as they make up the context, not of the
attributor, but of the “subject”, the person who is being attributed/denied knowl-
edge. This is clear from Hawthorne, who insists that the practical importance, for
the subject, of being right and not making a mistake is epistemically crucial, since
a subject’s anxiety can contribute to making certain possibilities of error salient to
him, where salience is equated with relevance. These and only these possibilities
will have to be ruled out for the subject to truly count as knowing. Thus, one can
know more by worrying less. In particular, “the philosopher who worries about be-
ing a brain in a vat, etc., will know less than the dullard who doesn’t” ([18, p 167]).
The formal framework to be described in the next section will help us understand
more precisely where the connections between subjectivism, contextualism, anti-
skepticism and skepticism lie.
7.3 Static Formalism
In this section, we first propose a formal framework for reasoning about knowledge
in context, and then show how this framework can be used to capture the various
epistemological positions described in the previous section.
7.3.1 The Formal Framework
We first describe the “epistemic language” we will be using throughout the paper.
We then provide a “contextual semantics” for it that allows four possible definitions
of truth for epistemic formulas, and we investigate what usual logical properties of
knowledge are preserved in our proposed semantics and how.
Syntax
Definition 1. (Epistemic Language) LetAt be a set of atomic formulas and J a set
of agents. The language we will be using is defined by:
ϕ ∶= p ∣¬ϕ ∣ϕ ∧ϕ ∣K jϕ
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where p ∈At and j ∈ J.
We use the common definitions of ∨, →, and ↔ in terms of ¬ and ∧. The intended
reading of the epistemic operator K jϕ is “Agent j knows that ϕ”. As a convention,
an epistemic formula will be any formula containing at least one occurrence of an
epistemic operator, and a non-epistemic formula any formula that contains none.
As should be obvious, the epistemic language that we will be using is simply that
of standard epistemic logic.
Semantics
The semantics, however, will differ from the standard Kripke semantics in that it
will include (i) a set C of contexts, and (ii) a function R of relevance determining
the worlds that are relevant in each context:
Definition 2. (Contextual Model) A contextual model for the epistemic language is
a structure M = ⟨W,{K j ∶ j ∈ J},C,R,V ⟩ where (i) W is a non-empty set of worlds,
(ii) K j ⊆W ×W is a relation of epistemic accessibility (for each j ∈ J), (iii) C = {ci ∶
i ∈ I} is a non-empty set of contexts, which may be finite or not, such that J ⊆ I,
(iv) R ∶ C → ℘(W)W is a function of contextual relevance that associates with each
context ci, for each world w, the set of worlds that are relevant in ci for w, and (v)
V ∶At→℘(W) is a valuation associating with each atom p the set of worlds in which
p holds.
Remark. A context ci can be connected with an agent, i.e., when i ∈ J. But nothing
prevents us from connecting contexts with groups of agents instead of individual
agents, or with conversations, etc. Also, the semantics considered here remains neu-
tral as to the nature of contexts. (A possible modelling inspired by Discourse Rep-
resentation Theory and whereby contexts can evolve through time over the course
of several assertions will be described in Section 7.4).
The idea, then, is to relativize truth not only to (a model and) a world as in
standard Kripke semantics, but also to a context:
Definition 3. (Truth) Given a contextual model M = ⟨W,{K j ∶ j ∈ J},C,R,V ⟩, a
state w ∈W , and a formula ϕ in the epistemic language, we can define M,c,w ⊧ ϕ
in four possible ways, depending on the clause we choose for epistemic formulas,
as follows:
(i) M,c,w ⊧ p iff w ∈V(p)
(ii) M,c,w ⊧ ¬ϕ iffM,c,w /⊧ ϕ
(iii) M,c,w ⊧ ϕ ∧ψ iffM,c,w ⊧ ϕ andM,c,w ⊧ψ
(iv) M,ci,w ⊧ K jϕ iff for every w′, if K jww′ and w′ ∈ R(ck)(w) then
M,cl ,w
′ ⊧ ϕ with either one of the following options:
1.1. k = l = i
1.2. k = i, l = j
2.1. k = j, l = i
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2.2. k = l = j
To refer specifically to one of the four resulting definitions, we will subscript ⊧
with the appropriate number:M,c,w⊧1.2 ϕ ,M,c,w⊧2.2 ϕ , etc. We will sometimes
group the notions two-by-two, letting ⊧−.2 refer unspecifically to the ⊧1.2 case or the
⊧2.2 case, for instance; and ⊧ will refer indifferently to any one of the four notions.2
The Properties of Knowledge in Contextual Models
We may wonder if the following common axioms and inference rules are preserved
in our contextual models, and if not, what condition(s) must be imposed on the
relevance function in order to restore them?
K ⊧ (K jϕ ∧K j(ϕ →ψ))→Kψ
RN If ⊧ ϕ then ⊧K jϕ
T ⊧K jϕ → ϕ
D ⊧K jϕ → ¬K j¬ϕ , or ⊧ ¬K j
4 ⊧K jϕ →K jK jϕ
5 ⊧ ¬K jϕ →K j¬K jϕ
B ⊧ ϕ →K j¬K j¬ϕ
To answer this question, let us assume the following convention. In a given con-
textual model, from the relevance function R and a context ck, a new accessibility
relation Rck can be defined by:
∀w. ∀w′.Rck ww′⇔w′ ∈R(ck)(w).
Then, clause (iv) for epistemic formulas can be rewritten using the intersection
KKkj =KK j ∩Rck of the two accessibility relations:
(iv’) M,ci,w ⊧K jϕ iff for all w′ ∈W , if KKkj ww′ thenM,cl ,w′ ⊧ ϕ
(with some conditions on k and l)
Let Mn be the class of all (unrestricted) contextual models for n agents regardless of
the specific choice among options (1.1) to (2.2). It is easy to see that the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 4. Both the axiom (K) and the necessitation rule (RN) are valid with
respect to Mn:
(K) Mn ⊧ (K jϕ ∧K j(ϕ →ψ))→K jψ
(RN) If Mn ⊧ ϕ then Mn ⊧K jϕ
Things get more complex when we turn to the additional possible properties.
We will give only sufficient conditions for preserving these properties in contextual
models. Two cases are to be systematically distinguished:
2 We mention all four logically possible options here for the sake of exhaustiveness, although we
will not examine all of them. To be precise, option 2.1 will not be relevant to our purpose. See
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1. A simple case has to do with the (–.1) definitions, which by (iv’) amount to:
(iv’/–.1) M,ci,w ⊧−.1 K jϕ iff for all w′ ∈W , if KKkj ww′ then
M,ci,w
′ ⊧−.1 ϕ .
Here, the only role of context ci is to set the value of k. The definition is
strictly equivalent to that of truth in the standard Kripke modelM′ = ⟨W,{KK j ∶
j ∈ J},V ⟩ that corresponds with the contextual model M = ⟨W,{KK j ∶ j ∈
J},C,R,V ⟩, for an operator Kkj with accessibility relation KKkj :
M,ci,w ⊧−.1 K jϕ ⇔M′,w ⊧Kkj ϕ.
Intuitively, contextual models will preserve for K j, the principles corresponding
to the properties of KK j that are preserved by KKkj . To be precise:
Proposition 5. The axioms (T), (B), (4), and (5) are (1.1)- and (2.1)-valid in
contextual modelsM whose relations K j andRck are all respectively reflexive,
symmetric, transitive, and Euclidean:
(T) M⊧−.1 K jϕ → ϕ) ⇔ KK jis reflexive and w ∈R(ck)(w) (for all w)
(B) M ⊧−.1 ϕ → K j¬K j¬ϕ ⇔ KK j is symmetric and w ∈R(ck)(w′)⇒ w′ ∈R(ck)(w)
(4) M ⊧−.1 K jϕ → K jK jϕ ⇔ KK j is transitive and w ∈R(ck)(w′) & w′ ∈R(ck)(w′′)
⇒ w ∈R(ck)(w
′′)
(5) M ⊧−.1 ¬K jϕ → K j¬K jϕ ⇔ KK j is Euclidean and w ∈R(ck)(w′) & w ∈R(ck)(w′′)
⇒ w′ ∈R(ck)(w
′′)
Making K j andRck serial is not sufficient to ensure the validity of (D).
2. The case is more complicated with the (-.2) definitions, which by (iv’) again
amount to:
(iv’/–.2) M,ci,w ⊧−.2 K jϕ iff for all w′ ∈W , if KKkj ww′ then
M,c j,w′ ⊧−.2 ϕ .
The difficulty here has to do with formulas with embedded modalities, since
their truth will depend on several contexts. We illustrate this with axioms (T),
(4), and (5):
Proposition 6. Schema (T) is neither (1.2)-valid nor (2.2)-valid in contextual
models M with reflexive K j and Rck relations. Nevertheless, the following in-
stances of (T) hold in these models:
• M,ci,w ⊧−.2 K jϕ → ϕ , for ϕ a non-epistemic formula;
• M,ci,w⊧−.2 K jϕ→ϕ ifRci ⊆Rc j , for ϕ an epistemic formula in disjunctive
normal form with no negated epistemic operator in it;
• M,ci,w ⊧−.2 K jϕ → ϕ if Rci =Rc j , for ϕ an epistemic formula in normal
disjunctive form with at least one negated epistemic operator.
Proposition 7. Validity of (4):
• Schema (4) is (2.2)-valid in contextual models M with reflexive K j and Rck
relations;
footnote 6.
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• Schema (4) is not (1.2)-valid in contextual modelsM with transitive K j and
Rck relations. Nonetheless, the following instantiation of (4) holds in such
models:M,ci,w ⊧1.2 K jϕ →K jK jϕ ifRc j ⊆Rci .
Proposition 8. Validity of (5):
• Schema (5) is (2.2)-valid in contextual models M with Euclidean K j and
Rck relations;
• Schema (5) is not (1.2)-valid in contextual models M with Euclidean K j
and Rck relations. However, in such models the following instantiation of
(5) holds:M,ci,w ⊧1.2 ¬K jϕ →K j¬K jϕ ifRc j ⊆Rci .
We add a final technical remark:
Proposition 9. (Reduction to Standard Kripke Semantics) Definition (1.1) with w-
constant relevance function R – i.e. such that for any context c, R(c) is constant –
reduces to a case of standard Kripkean semantics.
The proofs of the above propositions are in the Appendix.
7.3.2 The Formal Framework Applied
We now give an epistemological interpretation of our formalism and an application
of it in capturing, within a unique framework, the various epistemological positions
described in Section 7.2.
7.3.2.1 Elements of Epistemological Interpretation
Interpreting the K j-s
We propose to interpret the accessibility relations K j in terms of epistemic indis-
cernibility, i. e., we have K jww′ iff agent j cannot tell w from w′ on the (sole) basis
of what he knows. If ϕ holds in a K j-accessible world thus interpreted, then for all
j knows, it might be that ϕ; in other words, it is epistemically possible that ϕ .
A question that naturally arises is what kind of relation is the epistemic acces-
sibility relation. Here, our answer is that the K j are to be construed as equivalence
relations – i.e. reflexive, symmetric, and transitive – thus following the common
tendency in the logico-epistemic literature.3 The main epistemological reason for
this is that as a general rule, epistemologists grant the skeptic the premiss that their
skeptical worlds are epistemically indiscernible from the actual world, i.e., are ex-
actly the same as the actual world with respect to whatever evidence or information
we may have; and being exactly the same as is an equivalence relation.
3 See for instance the reference handbook [12] on epistemic logic by Fagin et al. Dissenting views
do nonetheless exist, as expressed by Hintikka in [22], and more recently by Stalnaker in [34].
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InterpretingR
The relevance function R allows us to capture the idea of epistemic standards and
their contextual variability. Indeed, it makes it possible to represent, for a given sit-
uation or world, the set of possible worlds that are relevant relative to a context,
where the appropriate context (reference context, agent’s context, etc.) depends on
which definition we select for ⊧. Given a world w, two contexts c, c′ can be associ-
ated with two sets of contextually relevant worlds, R(c)(w) and R(c′)(w). When
R(c)(w) ⊆R(c′)(w), the truth of an epistemic formula relative to c′ will be more
difficult to obtain than relative to c. So, each context can be understood as deter-
mining via R a certain level of epistemic requirement. The strengthening – resp.
the weakening – of epistemic standards will thus translate, in our framework, as an
extension – resp. a restriction – of the set of relevant worlds.
Epistemic Accessibility and Contextual Relevance
The set of contextually relevant worlds for an agent j in a world w cannot be strictly
included in the set of epistemically possible worlds for j. For j could know that ϕ ,
hence having his accessibility relation K j restricted to ϕ-worlds, yet also know that
another agent k does not know that ϕ when some ¬ϕ-world is accessible by Kk;
this requires that j be able to consider some of these ¬ϕ-worlds although they are
not accessible to him. So, letting K( j)(w) = {w′ ∶ w′ ∈W &K jww′} be the set of
worlds that are epistemically accessible to agent j, what we must not have is this:
R(c j)(w) ⊊K( j)(w).
Interpreting the ci-s
Crucial to the epistemological use we want to make of our formal framework is the
distinction between the subject and the attributor of knowledge. In both cases, how-
ever, we are dealing with an agent. In one case, it is the agent i whom knowledge
of a proposition ϕ is being attributed to; in the other case, it is the agent j who at-
tributes knowledge of ϕ to i. An agent can also attribute knowledge of a proposition
to himself in the first person, as in “I know this-or-that”. In this case, he is both
knowledge attributor and knowing subject.
To account for these various cases in our framework, we adopt the following
conventions. In an evaluation of the form M,ci,w ⊧ K jϕ , (i) at the most general
level, context ci will be called the “context of reference”, and c j the “context of
agent j ”; (ii) for i ∈ I, on the one hand, agent i will be associated with the “attributor”
and ci referred to as “attributor i’s context”, and on the other hand, agent j will be
associated with the “subject” and c j referred to as “subject j’s context”; and (iii)
when considering R(ck)(w), we shall refer to ck as the “attributor’s context” or as
the “subject’s context” depending on whether k = i or k = j.
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7.3.2.2 Epistemological Interpretation of the ⊧-s
We can now consider the various definitions of ⊧ and connect them with the various
epistemological positions mentioned earlier. As we will see, one of the major ad-
vantages of our formalism is that it shows what answer each of these positions can
give to a problem often underestimated in the epistemological literature, viz. that of
embedded epistemic operators.
A first observation is that there seems to be no noticeable difference between
definition (1.1) and definition (1.2) as far as their epistemological interpretation is
concerned. The former:
M,ci,w ⊧1.1 K jϕ iff for every w′, if K jww′ and w′ ∈R(ci)(w) thenM,ci,w′ ⊧ ϕ
says, basically, that I (= attributor) can truly say that you (= subject) know that ϕ
when I can truly say, against my epistemic standards, that given your evidence, you
know that ϕ; and the latter definition:
M,ci,w ⊧1.2 K jϕ iff for every w′, if K jww′ and w′ ∈R(ci)(w) thenM,c j,w′ ⊧ ϕ
says, basically, that I (= attributor) can truly say that you (= subject) know that ϕ
when you can truly say, against my epistemic standards, that given your evidence,
you know that ϕ . On both definitions, whether a world is relevant or not depends on
the attributor’s context.
However, an important difference shows up between the two definitions when we
turn to formulas with embedded occurrences of epistemic operators, e.g. formulas
like K1K2...Kmϕ .
Definition (1.1) as Invariantism
Regarding embedded epistemic operators, definition (1.1) yields:
M,c1,w ⊧1.1 K2K3ϕ iff for every w′,w′′, if K2ww′, K3w′w′′, w′ ∈R(c1)(w) and
w′′ ∈R(c1)(w′), thenM,c1,w′′ ⊧1.1 ϕ .
which amounts to saying this: When attributor 1 says that subject 2 knows that sub-
ject 3 knows that ϕ , for 1’s attribution to be true, it is always exactly the same stan-
dards as 2 that 3 must satisfy, that is to say, those in place in attributor 1’s context.
We propose to associate this definition with the two (insensitive) invariantist posi-
tions distinguished in Section 7.2, viz. skepticism and anti-skepticism. Both hold
that the standards for making a true knowledge attribution are the same always and
everywhere, regardless of who is attributing and who is being attributed knowledge.
Simply, the former holds that those standards are too demanding for any such attri-
bution to ever come out true, while the latter says they are lax enough to make (most
of our) everyday knowledge attributions true.
The difference can be expressed formally in our framework by putting different
constraints on the relevance functionR:
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• For skepticism, the constraint that R(ci)(w) = W , for any i and any w. This
means that whatever the attributor’s context, the corresponding relevance set is
always the entire set of all logically possible worlds, including, of course, such
far-fetched worlds as those described by the Evil Genius or the Brain in a Vat
hypotheses, which cannot be eliminated on the basis of our limited epistemic
capabilities. In assuming this constraint, the skeptic make-believes that she is a
god, and that people can reason on other people’s knowledge only if they are
gods themselves. Skeptical epistemic logic is epistemic logic for divine agents.
• For anti-skepticism, the constraint that for any i and any w, R(ci)(w) = W∗,
for some proper subset W∗ of W , seems to be a minimum requirement, which
nonetheless makes it less impossible for non-divine epistemic agents like us to
truly claim knowledge. At least in some cases, all contextually relevant possibil-
ities of error can be excluded. A further requirement – given here informally as a
first approximation – will have to be that W∗ be a set of epistemically accessible
worlds where most propositions we ordinarily think we have knowledge of are
true (e.g. that we have hands).
As should be clear, either one of these constraints will ensure that the set of epis-
temically relevant worlds is constant across contexts, that is, for any w, i, and j,
R(ci)(w) = R(c j)(w), which justifies applying to them the label "invariantism".4
Definition (1.2) as Contextualism
In contrast with definition (1.1), with embedded epistemic operators, definition (1.2)
yields:
M,c1,w ⊧1.2 K2K3ϕ iff for every w′,w′′, if K2ww′, K3w′w′′, w′ ∈R(c1)(w) and
w′′ ∈R(c2)(w′), thenM,c3,w′′ ⊧1.2 ϕ .
This entails that if an attributor 1 says that subject 2 knows that subject 3 knows that
ϕ , for 1’s attribution to be true, the standards that 2 must satisfy for 1’s attribution to
be true will be those in place in 1’s context, while those that 3 must satisfy for it to
be true that he knows ϕ will be those in place in subject 2’s context, not attributor 1’s
context; and the two sets of standards might well be different in their requirements.
This, in our opinion, is what we may and must expect from the behavior of gen-
uine contextualist agents (who assume themselves to be such): a contextualist agent
ought to reason about other agents’ knowledge in the light of her own standards,
but she also ought to be aware that the other agents do and ought to do the same
too. We therefore suggest associating definition (1.2) with (genuine, self-assumed,
coherent) contextualism.5 To capture formally the contextualist idea that the views
4 Note in passing that they make the epistemic relevance set constant across worlds too, differing
in this respect from "non-absolutist", "circumstance-sensitive" forms of invariantism à la Dretske
or Nozick, not treated here.
5 Here, some proponents of contextualism might disagree, as they would be willing to maintain that
contextualism is true despite most people lacking awareness of this fact, and being semantically
blind to the context-dependence of knowledge ascriptions. This is how, for instance, DeRose seems
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of the skeptic and the anti-skeptic are not incompatible, we can simply put onR the
softer constraint that R(ci)(w) ⊆W , so that when ci is a philosophical context, R
yields the set of all logically possible worlds, and when it is an everyday context,R
yields a proper subset of those worlds – preferentially with epistemically possible
worlds where most of what we ordinarily think we know is true.
Interestingly, identifying contextualism with definition (1.2) in this way shows
that contextualism renders a relatively uncontroversial epistemic principle truly
problematic, viz. the “veridicality principle” whereby knowledge requires truth. As
Proposition 6 indicates, the formal version of this principle (schema (T) Kϕ → ϕ)
is (1.2)-valid in contextual models with reflexive contextualized accessibility rela-
tions Kki only when ϕ is non-epistemic. This restriction of the implication from
knowledge to truth to non-epistemic “facts” is totally in line with the spirit of con-
textualism for which there are no such things as “epistemic facts”. “Know” does not
relate to things like knowledge1,knowledge2, ... that would exist objectively. Since
one can count as knowing with respect to one attributor, yet as not knowing with re-
spect to another, the contextualist’s concept of knowledge cannot be descriptive, but
only purely evaluative. So, if knowledge implies truth, it can only be non-epistemic
truth. This is a consequence of contextualism that our proposed formal framework
makes clearly salient.
Definition (2.2) as Subjectivism
According to Proposition 6, we get similar restricted veridicality with definition
(2.2.):
M,ci,w ⊧2.2 K jϕ iff for every w′, if K jww′ and w′ ∈R(c j)(w) thenM,c j,w′ ⊧ ϕ
This definition, however, is very different from the contextualist spirit of definition
(1.2), and closer in our opinion to the spirit of subjectivism. What it says is that only
the subject, j, matters. When we attribute knowledge of a proposition to a subject,
it is the standards in place in his context, not ours, that matter for the truth or falsity
of our attribution. His context is also that in which he himself settles on the truth of
the proposition whose knowledge we attribute to him. This means that according to
this definition (unlike contextualist definition (1.2)), there are epistemic facts: it is
the subject’s knowledge that varies from context to context, not merely the truth of
our attributions of knowledge to him. Depending on what is at stake in his context,
a subject can possess, lack, or lose possession of his knowledge. This is in line with
the characterization we gave earlier of subjectivism.
Now, although (not) knowing something is an epistemic fact, someone A’s know-
ing that someone else B knows something p does not entail that B knows p. For
suppose it is true that A knows that B knows p. Then, A must somehow satisfy the
standards in place in his own context for knowing that B knows p. Does this mean
that B thereby knows p? No, because nothing in subjectivism prohibits A priori that
to conceive of the position. In [28], we insist on the distinction between these two construals of the
contextualist stance and explore their respective bearings on the issue of epistemic factivity.
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the standards in place in B’s context be no more demanding than those in place in
A’s context. So, if subjectivism is true, veridicality cannot extend to one’s knowl-
edge of someone else’s knowledge. This is exactly what definition (2.2) says, and
constitutes further motivation for associating subjectivism with it.6
7.4 Dynamic Formalism
7.4.1 The Main Idea
The notion of context in the previous section was left totally unspecified: we simply
took it as a point ci in a set C. In this section we propose a dynamic formalization of
this notion, inspired by the semantics of discourse for natural languages.
The semantics of discourse, in particular Discourse Representation Theory
(DRT), was invented by Kamp [23] to account for semantic phenomena specifi-
cally connected with discourse dynamics (as opposed to sentence dynamics) and
not explainable in standard, say Montagovian, analysis: anaphora resolution, don-
key sentences, etc.7 The “dynamic turn” in formal semantics has led to the creation
of other formalisms too, like DPL (Dynamic Predicate Logic; see [16]) where the
semantic value of an utterance is treated as a program modifying a context.
DRT builds an intermediate representational level between language and model,
made of discourse representation structures (DRSs). Each DRS constitutes both (i)
the context of interpretation and (ii) the update of an already given DRS by this
interpretation – yielding a new DRS. What matters here is the idea of introducing a
representational level produced by the interpretation, and which contains “syntactic
traces” of the various assertions made in a discourse.
7.4.2 Pseudo-DRT for a Propositional Language
For our purposes we will not need such a complex formalism as in DRT. We will
not need a universe (due to the lack of individual variables) – except if we want
to specify features of extralinguistic context like the speaker, the place, etc., and in
6 As mentioned in footnote 2, for our purposes, we do not need definition (2.1):
M,ci,w ⊧2.1 Kiϕ iff for every w′, if K jww′ and w′ ∈R(c j)(w) then M,ci,w′ ⊧ ϕ
which says that I (attributor) can truly say that you (=subject) know that ϕ when I can truly say,
against your epistemic standards, that given your evidence, you know that ϕ . It might, however,
prove useful if we augmented the non-modal part of the language with indexical expressions in
order to account for such knowledge ascriptions as “So-and-so knows that I am here” or “I know
that you are there”.
7 For an overview, see [39]; for a more complete presentation, see [24].
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what follows we will simply dispense with such features. However, we will need
and make use of a set of conditions preceded with a label (in the spirit of [14]).
As usual, a DRS (i.e. a context) will be represented by a box. For instance, the
DRS produced by the interpretation of the following discourse:
ϕ1; if ϕ1 then agent i knows that ϕ2; therefore i knows that ϕ2
will be represented by:
c = A ϕ1, ϕ1 →Kiϕ2, Kiϕ2
where the label A is meant to indicate that the relevant context was produced by
means of a sequence of assertions. (We do not introduce sub-DRSs since in a propo-
sitional language the question of accessibility between universes does not arise.)
This context will be interpreted against a “proto-context”, that is to say, a set of
presuppositions consisting exclusively of literals, i.e. atoms or negations of atoms
(of the form “Agent i is not a brain in a vat”, or “Agent j’s vision is reliable”). This
proto-context will be represented by a box labelled with P:
c⋆ = P h1, h2, ..., hn .
Several definitions are in order here.
Definition 10. A discourse in language L is a finite (ordered) sequence of formulas
of L:
D = ⟨ϕ1, ..., ϕp⟩
Definition 11. A (discourse) context for L is a pair consisting of a label X and a set
Σ of formulas of L: c = ⟨X , Σ⟩. Notation: X Σ .
– An assertion context is a context labelled with A: A ϕ1, ..., ϕm .
– A proto-context, or presupposition context, is a context labelled with P :
P h1, h2, ..., hn , each of the formulas hi being a literal.
To refer to the labels, formulas, and atoms involved in a context, we use the
following conventions:
Notation 12. Writing conventions:
• The label of a context c is written Lab(c) – i.e. Lab( X Σ ) = X ;
• The set of formulas of a context c is written Fo(c) – i.e. Fo( X Σ ) = Σ ;
• The set of atoms making up the formulas of a context c is written At(c): At(c) ∈
℘(At).
Definition 13. The agglomeration of a formula ϕ with a context c, written c+ϕ , is
a binary function on C ×L taking its values in C and defined as follows:
X ϕ1, ..., ϕl +ψ = X ϕ1, ..., ϕl , ψ .
The foregoing definition entails that if a formula is already in a context, its agglom-
eration does not modify this context.
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Definition 14. The representation of a discourse D = ⟨ϕ1, ..., ϕp⟩ relative to a con-
text c, R(c,D), is a finite sequence of assertion contexts ⟨c0, c1, ..., cp⟩ formed by
successive agglomeration of the formulas of D, i.e. such that:
• if c = X ϕ1, ..., ϕl , then c0 = A ϕ1, ..., ϕl ;
• for each index i ∈ {0, ..., p−1}, we have: ci+1 = ci+ϕi+1.
Now that we can represent discourses by a set of markers (the formulas of the con-
text) representing the various assertions of a discourse, we must consider the seman-
tic interpretation of contexts.
Definition 15. The semantic value JcK of a context c in a Kripke model M =
⟨W,K,V ⟩ is the set of possible worlds compatible with the formulas of c:
If c = X ϕ1, ..., ϕl , then JcK = {w ∶w ∈W &M,w ⊧ (ϕ1∧ ...∧ϕl)} .
What remains to be done is to introduce a dynamic component at the level of proto-
contexts. A proto-context must enable regimentation of the presuppositions of a
discourse, that is, of those statements whose truth is not put into question and which
are not even made explicit in the discourse context. The discourse itself can make a
presupposition explicit or put it into question, and thereby modify the proto-context.
Definition 16. The fusion of two contexts is a partial binary function # ∶ C ×C → C
such that, for any pair ⟨c1, c2⟩ where c1 = P h1, h2, ..., hn is a proto-context and
c2 = A ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕm is an assertion context:
c1#c2 = P h1, h2, ..., hn # A ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕm = P hi1 , hi2 , ..., hik
with:
• Fo(c1#c2) ⊆ Fo(c1) ;
• At(c1)/At(c1#c2) = At(c1)∩At(c2).
In other words, fusion removes from the proto-context all those literals that are
atoms or negations of atoms included in the assertion context. Based on this defini-
tion, we can then consider a new sequence of contexts resulting from the analysis of
a discourse, viz. the sequence of proto-contexts which parallels the representation
of the discourse:
Definition 17. Given a proto-context c⋆ and a discourse D = ⟨ϕ1, ..., ϕp⟩ interpreted
relative to an initial context c with representation R(c,D) = ⟨c0, c1, ..., cp⟩, we build
the history of proto-context c⋆, written H(c⋆,c,D), consisting of a sequence of
proto-contexts ⟨c⋆0 , c⋆1 , ..., c⋆p⟩ such that:
• c⋆0 = c⋆#c ;
• for every index i ∈ {0, ..., p−1}, we have: c⋆i+1 = c⋆i #ci+1 .
A history of proto-contexts thus explains the progressive modification of the set of
presuppositions by removing the literals that are made explicit (or whose negation
is made explicit) in the discourse.
We can associate with a history of proto-contexts a (w-constant) relevance func-
tion such that:
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∀w ∶R(c⋆i )(w) = Jc⋆i K.
This function allows the set of contextually relevant worlds to evolve over the course
of the interpretation of a discourse.
7.4.3 Application
The static formalism described in Section 7.3 runs into a problem faced by all sys-
tems of normal modal logic and having to do with the logical omniscience that
follows from accepting axiom K – the epistemic closure principle – and the neces-
sitation rule.
The DRT-based semantics just described allows us to overcome these difficulties.
The effects of the necessitation rule can indeed be bypassed if we suppose that
each assertion modifies the evaluation context. That is to say, although we do have
Kϕ1, K(ϕ1→ϕ2), Kϕ2 relative to a constant context, this is no longer the case when
the context evolves over a sequence of assertions.
We propose evaluating Kϕ1 relative to an initial empty context, c = A ; we
then evaluate the next formula K(ϕ1 → ϕ2) relative to the new context produced by
the agglomeration of Kϕ1, viz.: c1 = A Kϕ1 . This generates a third context, c2 =
A Kϕ1, K(ϕ1 → ϕ2) , relative to which the conclusion Kϕ2 can be false, depending
on the effect of the first two assertions on the history of the initial proto-context.
Example.
To make things simple, let us assume an epistemic language with only one opera-
tor K and a unique relation K. Given a presupposition context containing h1 = ¬r,
read as “The agent is not a brain in a vat”, the initial proto-context then is: c⋆ =
P ¬r, h2, ..., hn , and corresponds with ordinary, rather lax epistemic standards,
quite unlike those of the skeptic. Let us analyze the following (well-known) piece
of discourse:
• ϕ1. The agent knows that he has two hands.
• ϕ2. If the agent knows that he has two hands then he knows that he is not a brain
in a vat.
• ϕ3. Therefore, the agent knows that he is not a brain in a vat.
Letting p stand for the atom expressing that the agent has two hands, we get the
following discourse: D = ⟨K p, K(p→ ¬r), K¬r⟩. To interpret it, we suppose that
neither p nor ¬p is part of the initial presuppositions (p ∉ At(c⋆)). In the following
figure, the two sequences generated by D are in two parallel columns:
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D representation of D proto-context history
c⋆ = P ¬r,h2, ...,hn
c0 = c = A c⋆0 = P ¬r,h2, ...,hn
ϕ1. K p c1 = A K p c⋆1 = P ¬r,h2, ...,hn
ϕ2. K(p→ ¬r) c2 = A K p,K(p→ ¬r) c⋆2 = P h2, ...,hn
ϕ3. K¬r c3 = A K p,K(p→ ¬r),K¬r c⋆3 = P h2, ...,hn
As mentioned above, we can put the history of the proto-context to use to define a
relevance function, thereby obtaining a constant function on c⋆, c⋆0 , and c⋆1 , whose
co-domain (the relevant worlds) extends from c⋆2 :
R(c⋆) =R(c⋆0 ) =R(c⋆1 ) = Jc⋆K ⊊ Jc⋆2 K =R(c⋆2 ) =R(c⋆3 ).
Each formula ϕi of D is interpreted against the previous context of the representa-
tion, ci−1. Let us suppose that the interpretation of the first two assertions is true in
a given world w. Then:
M,c0,w ⊧ K p i.e.: ∀w′ ∈R(c⋆0 )(w)(= Jc
⋆K) ∶ Kw,w′ ⇒M,c0,w
′ ⊧ p
M,c1,w ⊧ K(p→¬r) i.e.: ∀w′ ∈R(c⋆1 )(w)(= Jc
⋆K) ∶ Kw,w′ ⇒M,c1,w
′ ⊧ (p→¬r)
It follows that relative to c1, the formula K¬r is true in w. But it is relative to c2 that
it is evaluated, whose class of relevant worlds is a proper extension of Jc⋆K:
M,c2,w ⊧K¬r ⇔ ∀w′′ ∈R(c⋆2 )(w)(= Jc⋆2 K) ∶ Kw,w′′ ⇒M,c2,w′′ ⊧ ¬r .
So, for K¬ϕ to fail to hold in w, all we need is a world that is K-accessible from w,
where the agent is a brain in a vat, and which is relevant in context c2. And in this
context, unlike in c1, there can be one such world, as the following example shows.
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7.4.4 Discourse Contexts and Belief Bases
The dynamic approach just proposed is akin to the well-known AGM model of
belief revision proposed in [1] (for a recent overview, see [38]). We chose not to
make use of the latter approach because it is not sensitive enough to the syntax of
formulas, and is therefore too static.
Belief bases in the AGM model are deductively closed: this results in a level of
idealization that is too high to deal with certain epistemological issues (see [17]),
as we inherit ipso facto the problems of logical omniscience. By contrast, the DRT-
inspired discourse contexts are finite – and even very limited – sets of formulas: only
those formulas that directly represent assertions are introduced in an assertion con-
text. A formula being in a context therefore does not imply that, say, all disjunctions
containing that formula are in that context. Unlike belief bases, discourse contexts
are not deductively closed.
The set of formulas of a given context c, Fo(c), nonetheless coincides with its
deductive closure (Cn(c)) as far as evaluation is concerned. We can then consider
describing agglomeration as an expansion, and fusion of a proto-context with an
assertion context as a contraction of the proto-context.
Belief revision theories could also be of relevance at the level of assertion con-
texts when a discourse generates an inconsistency that calls for a revision of the
DRS. Several connections can therefore be drawn between the approach developed
in this paper and the dominant approaches to doxastic dynamics in artificial intelli-
gence.
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7.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have laid out the foundations of a formal framework that uses the
tools of epistemic logic to advance epistemological analysis.
Epistemologically speaking, the application of our framework to capturing var-
ious philosophical positions about knowledge will have to be extended so as to
account for two sorts of positions: “assessment-sensitive” positions à la Macfar-
lane [29], for whom epistemic standards vary with the context of the person who
evaluates a knowledge ascription for truth or falsity; and “circumstance-sensitive”
positions as those advanced by Dretske or Nozick, for whom epistemic standards
vary not with any context whatsoever, but with the world with respect to which the
subject’s epistemic position is being evaluated. This is left for future work.
Logically speaking, the very framework of contextual models requires further ex-
ploration. Here we have sketched a “deviant” two-dimensional semantics that aug-
ments the usual possible world structure with a relevance function. A step further
would be to develop a syntax to match those models by introducing context op-
erators of the type [ci] and ⟨ci⟩, which would make it possible to refer explicitly
to context-dependence directly in the object-language.8 Combining such operators
with contextualized epistemic operators would allow us to capture various episte-
mological positions within the same contextual model, and therefore to account for
the logical behavior of, say, a contextualist agent reasoning about the knowledge
of a skeptical agent reasoning about an anti-skeptical agent. The contextual model
framework could also be extended along further lines, e.g.:
• by exploring different axiom systems (S4, T, etc.) for defining the epistemic op-
erators Ki;
• by adding an awareness operator, or a notion of similarity between worlds, or
any other modification that might block epistemic closure at the “static” level of
the framework (as required by positions like Dretske’s or Nozick’s);
• by adding operators for belief and justification (possibly in the line of [2]);
• by adding appropriate alethic modalities to allow for the treatment of counterfac-
tual epistemic statements like “Had Mary seen Paul at the party, she’d know”;
• by adding indexical symbols to the non-modal fragment of the language so as to
account for statements like “Mary knows I’m in Paris” or “I know you’re there”.
This too is left for future work.
Generally speaking, studying how our epistemic language can be modified and
enriched should allow us to provide a finer-grained modelling of the various posi-
tions that can be found in the epistemological literature within our framework of
contextual models.
8 Work in this vein can be found in our paper on “contextual epistemic logic” [32].
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Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 5
The axioms (T), (B), (4), and (5) are (1.1)- and (2.1)-valid in contextual models M
whose relations K j andRck are all respectively reflexive, symmetric, transitive, and
Euclidean:
(T) M⊧−.1 K jϕ → ϕ) ⇔ KK jis reflexive and w ∈R(ck)(w) (for all w)
(B) M ⊧−.1 ϕ → K j¬K j¬ϕ ⇔ KK j is symmetric and w ∈R(ck)(w′)⇒ w′ ∈R(ck)(w)
(4) M ⊧−.1 K jϕ → K jK jϕ ⇔ KK j is transitive and w ∈R(ck)(w′) & w′ ∈R(ck)(w′′)
⇒ w ∈R(ck)(w
′′)
(5) M ⊧−.1 ¬K jϕ → K j¬K jϕ ⇔ KK j is Euclidean and w ∈R(ck)(w′) & w ∈R(ck)(w′′)
⇒ w′ ∈R(ck)(w
′′)
Making K j andRck serial is not sufficient to ensure the validity of (D).
Proof.
• Suppose that for any j and k, KK j and Rck are reflexive. Since the intersection of two
reflexive relations is itself reflexive, the intersection KKkj of KK j and Rck must be re-
flexive. Therefore, M′,w ⊧ Kkj ϕ → ϕ , which amounts to M,ci,w ⊧−.1 K jϕ → ϕ .
• As to axioms (B), (4) and (5), we can likewise simply observe that symmetry, transitivity
and Euclideanness are preserved by the intersection of two relations.
• As to axiom (D), however, seriality is not preserved in this way. For instance, the two
relations S = {⟨a,b⟩ ,⟨b,b⟩} and T = {⟨a,b⟩ ,⟨b,a⟩} are both serial, yet their intersection
boils down to {⟨a,b⟩}.
Proposition 6
Schema (T) is neither (1.2)-valid nor (2.2)-valid in contextual models M with re-
flexive K j and Rck relations. Nevertheless, the following instances of (T) hold in
these models:
• M,ci,w ⊧−.2 K jϕ → ϕ , for ϕ a non-epistemic formula;
• M,ci,w ⊧−.2 K jϕ → ϕ if Rci ⊆Rc j , for ϕ an epistemic formula in disjunctive
normal form with no negated epistemic operator in it;
• M,ci,w ⊧−.2 K jϕ → ϕ if Rci =Rc j , for ϕ an epistemic formula in normal dis-
junctive form with at least one negated epistemic operator.
Proof.
• (T) is not (-.2)-valid: LetM be a contextual model with reflexive relations, ci a context,
and w a world s.t. for any given formula ϕ , M,ci,w ⊧−.2 K jϕ . Then, for every w′ s.t.
KKkj ww
′
, M,c j,w′ ⊧−.2 ϕ . Since KKkj is reflexive, in particular M,c j,w ⊧−.2 ϕ . This
does not imply that M,ci,w ⊧−.2 ϕ: for instance, if ϕ is of the form Kmψ , there can be
a world w0 s.t. Rci ww0, ¬Rc j ww0 where ψ is not satisfied.
• Under the same assumptions, take ϕ to be non-epistemic. Then, from clauses (i)-(iii) for
⊧ in contextual models, the value of ϕ is independent of context. So, M,c j,w ⊧−.2 ϕ
entails M,ci,w ⊧−.2 ϕ . Therefore, (T)’s instantiation with non-epistemic formulas is
(-.2)-valid.
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• With the same assumptions again, let us further suppose (1) ϕ to be in normal disjunctive
form with no negation of an epistemic operator, and (2) thatRci ⊆Rc j . Then, ϕ is a dis-
junction of formulas: ϕh = Kh1 ψh1 ∧Khm ψhm ∧ψhm+1 ∧ . . .∧ψhm+n , for ψhm+1 , . . . ,ψhm+n
non-epistemic formulas. When M,c j,w ⊧−.2 ϕ , we have two cases:
1. The truth of ϕ =ϕ1∨ . . .∨ϕk rests on a sub-formula ϕh with no epistemic component.
In this case,M,c j,w⊧−.2 ϕh implies thatM,ci,w⊧−.2 ϕh, hence thatM,ci,w⊧−.2
ϕ .
2. The truth of ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ . . .∨ϕk rests on a sub-formula ϕh with epistemic components,
hence on the truth of the sub-formulas Kh1 ψh1 , . . . ,Khm ψhm of ϕh. Therefore, for
each index e ∈ {h1, . . . ,hm}, we have M,c j,w ⊧−.2 Keψe; in other words, for all
w′, if KKke ww′ then M,ce,w′ ⊧−.2 ψe. We (provisionally) distinguish the two (-.2)
definitions:
2.2: M,c j,w ⊧2.2 Keψe equates: for all w′, if KKee ww′ then M,ce,w′ ⊧2.2
ψe; in other words, the truth condition of Keψe is independent of context
c j; so, we also have: M,ci,w ⊧2.2 Keψe.
1.2: M,c j,w ⊧1.2 Keψe equates: for all w′, if KK je ww′ then M,ce,w′ ⊧1.2
ψe; here, the truth condition for Keψe depends on context c j . But we
have assumed thatRci ⊆Rc j , which entails thatRci ∩KKe ⊆Rc j ∩KKe,
i.e. KKie ⊆ KK
j
e . Therefore, for all w′, if KKieww′ then KK
j
e ww
′
, hence
M,ce,w
′ ⊧1.2 ψe. This amounts to M,ci,w ⊧1.2 Keψe.
We have thus shown that for each of the epistemic components Keψe of ϕh,
M,ci,w ⊧−.2 Keψe; for the non-epistemic components ψhm+1 , . . . ,ψhm+n , truth
is independent of context and transposes from c j to c j . Hence, we have estab-
lished that ϕh, M,ci,w ⊧−.2 ϕh, and therefore that M,ci,w ⊧−.2 ϕ . Conclusion:
we have M,ci,w ⊧−.2 K jϕ → ϕ .
• The case of formulas ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ . . .∨ϕk whose truth rests on conjunctive components ϕi
including sub-formulas of the type ¬Keψe requires more than the mere inclusion of the
sets of contextually relevant worlds. Assuming the identity of these sets guarantees the
transition of truth from context to context. The proof is similar to the previous one.
Proposition 7
Validity of (4):
• Schema (4) is (2.2)-valid in contextual models M with reflexive K j and Rck re-
lations;
• Schema (4) is not (1.2)-valid in contextual modelsM with transitive K j andRck
relations. Nonetheless, the following instantiation of (4) holds in such models:
M,ci,w ⊧1.2 K jϕ →K jK jϕ ifRc j ⊆Rci .
Proof.
(2.2): Let M be a contextual model with transitive relations, ci a context, w a world,
and ϕ a formula. We assume that (a) M,ci,w ⊧2.2 K jϕ , and, ad absurdum,
that (b) M,ci,w ⊭2.2 K jK jϕ . From (a), it follows that for any w′, if KK jj ww′
then M,c j,w ⊧2.2 ϕ . From (b), it follows that there are two worlds w1, w2, s.t.
KK jj ww1, KK
j
j w1w2, and (c)M,c j,w2 ⊭2.2 ϕ . Since the relations are supposed
to be transitive, we have KK jj ww2; and therefore by (a), we get M,c j,w2 ⊧2.2
ϕ , which directly contradicts (c). Conclusion: M,ci,w ⊧2.2 K jϕ → K jK jϕ .
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(1.2): Let M be a contextual model with transitive relations, ci and c j two contexts
s.t. Rc j ⊆Rci , w a world, and ϕ a formula. We assume that (a) M,ci,w ⊧1.2
K jϕ , and ad absurdum that (b) M,ci,w ⊭1.2 K jK jϕ . From (a), it follows that
for all w′, if KKijww
′ then M,c j,w ⊧1.2 ϕ . From (b), it follows that there are
two worlds w1, w2 s.t. KKijww1, KK
j
j w1w2, and (c) M,c j,w2 ⊭1.2 ϕ . Since
Rc j ⊆ Rci , we may infer KKijw1w2 from KK
j
j w1w2. Now, since the rela-
tions are supposed to be transitive, from KKijww1 and KKijw1w2 we may infer
KKijww2; therefore, by (a), we have M,c j,w2 ⊧1.2 ϕ , which contradicts (c).
Conclusion: M,ci,w ⊧1.2 K jϕ → K jK jϕ .
Proposition 8
Validity of (5):
• Schema (5) is (2.2)-valid in contextual models M with Euclidean K j and Rck
relations;
• Schema (5) is not (1.2)-valid in contextual models M with Euclidean K j and
Rck relations. However, in such models the following instantiation of (5) holds:
M,ci,w ⊧1.2 ¬K jϕ →K j¬K jϕ ifRc j ⊆Rci .
Proof.
The proof is similar to that of (4). We assume that we have both M,ci,w ⊧−.2 ¬K jϕ and
M,ci,w ⊧−.2 ¬K j¬K jϕ , which leads to contradictory requirements on a world w0, the first
assumption requiring that M,c j,w0 ⊭−.2 ϕ , the second implying that M,c j,w0 ⊭−.2 ϕ
given the Euclideanness of KK jj for (2.2), and that of KKij for (1.2).
Proposition 9
Definition (1.1) with w-constant relevance function R, i.e. s.t. for any context c,
R(c) is constant, reduces to a case of standard Kripkean semantics.
Proof: Suppose the relevance function R in a contextual model M =
⟨W,{KK j ∶ j ∈ I},C,R,V ⟩ is w-constant, and consider a particular context ci.
We build a standard Kripke model fromM,Mci = ⟨W ci ,{KKcij ∶ j ∈ I},Cci ,Rci ,V⟩,
where W ci = R(ci), and KKcij is the restriction of KK j to R(ci). Then, for any
world w ∈R(ci):
(i) if α is an atom:M,ci,w ⊧1.1 α ⇔w ∈V(α)⇔Mci ,w ⊧ α
For points (ii) and (iv) below, we accept the recurrence hypothesis: M,ci,w ⊧1.1
ϕ ⇔Mci ,w ⊧ ϕ , and for point (iii), the corresponding hypotheses with ϕ1 and ϕ2.
(ii) M,ci,w ⊧1.1 ¬ϕ ⇔M,ci,w ⊭1.1 ϕ ⇔Mci ,w ⊭ ϕ ⇔Mci ,w ⊧ ¬ϕ
(iii) M,ci,w ⊧1.1 ϕ1 ∨ϕ2 ⇔M,ci,w ⊧1.1 ϕ1 orM,ci,w ⊧1.1 ϕ2 ⇔
Mci ,w ⊧ ϕ1 orMci ,w ⊧ ϕ2 ⇔Mci ,w ⊧ ϕ1 ∨ϕ2
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(iv) M,ci,w ⊧1.1 K jϕ ⇔ for all w′ ∈W s.t. KK jww′, if w′ ∈R(ci) [=W ci]
then M,ci,w′ ⊧1.1 ϕ ⇔ for all w′ ∈W ci s.t. KK jww′, Mci ,w′ ⊧ ϕ ⇔
Mci ,w ⊧K jϕ .
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